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1MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
Abstract. We compare three common dispute resolution processes { negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration { in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Under
negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap
talk. Under mediation, the parties communicate with a neutral third party who
makes a non-binding recommendation. Under arbitration, the two parties commit
to conform to the third party recommendation. We characterize and compare the
optimal mediation and arbitration procedures. Both mediators and arbitrators should
optimally ¯lter information, but mediators should also add noise to it. We ¯nd that
unmediated negotiation performs as well as mediation if and only if the degree of
con°ict between the parties is low.
1. Introduction
Mediation is a procedure of dispute resolution broadly adopted in a number of con-
texts, from international crises, to legal confrontations, and business transactions. De-
spite the relevance and pervasiveness of mediation, applied experts report that the the-
oretical characterization of optimal mediation techniques is largely under-developed.
1
This paper characterizes the properties of optimal mediation and arbitration, for the
cases in which the source of con°ict is informational, and transfers cannot be estab-
lished to the disputants. Furthermore, we compare the performance of mediation and
arbitration with unmediated negotiation.
Despite the possibly complex information transmission strategies that a mediator can
adopt, we ¯nd that in our context a mediator acts optimally by gathering information
from the parties, ¯ltering it, and strategically adding noise to it.
2 Although it is widely
1The latest survey by Wall, Stark and Standifer (2001) concludes: \What techniques should mediators
use? And how can mediation be improved [...]? It is hoped that some of these questions will be studied
in the next decade."
2The role of mediators in providing disputants with information has been highlighted by Touval (1996).
Among other techniques adopted, the mediator can propose threats or punishments, determine which
points are negotiable, encourage concessions (Wall, Stark and Standifer, 2001), or attempt to reframe
the opponent in a more positive light (Umbreit, 1993).
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believed that a successful mediator should establish credible reports to the con°icting
parties, we ¯nd that a mediator that reports precisely all the information transmitted
would not act optimally. At the same, we show that there is bene¯t in mediation
over unmediated negotiation if and only if the degree of con°ict between the parties is
high. When the degree of con°ict is low, the con°icting parties can achieve the optimal
outcome of mediation with just two rounds of unmediated negotiation. These ¯ndings
resonate with well-documented stylized facts in the empirical literature on negotiation
(Bercovich and Jackson 2001, Carnevale and Pruitt 1992, Wall and Lynn, 1993), that
show that parties are less likely to reach an agreement without a mediator when the
intensity of con°ict is high than when it is low.
We study con°icts that arise because of informational advantage by one party, and
where the opposite party retains the ultimate right of making the ¯nal decision. For
example, in international con°icts, disproportionate military strength may endow one
party with the ability of imposing a ¯nal decision. The opposite party may nevertheless
have some private information on the best course of action to resolve the crisis, for
example on its willingness to accept concessions to avoid military confrontation. The
mediator's task is to try and elicit private information and avoid the military option.
We model these situations by adopting the standard classic framework by Crawford
and Sobel (1982).
3 Among the two parties, we distinguish an informed party and an
uninformed decision-maker. Each party's utility decreases with the distance to his
most preferred outcome. There is a con°ict of interest: in any state of the world, the
informed party's most preferred decision is higher than the decision-maker's.
Within this set-up, we consider the three most common means by which the parties
resolve disputes outside of court. In unfacilitated negotiation, or cheap talk, the two
parties directly and voluntarily exchange information back and forth, and attempt to
reach an acceptable agreement, rati¯ed by the decision maker.
4 Under mediation, a
3The model by Crawford and Sobel (1982) has been a foundation for theoretical and applied work on
communication in a variety of ¯elds, including political economy (Grossman and Helpman, 2001) and
¯nance (Morgan and Stocken, 2003).
4Although Crawford and Sobel considered the case in which the informed party has only one op-
portunity to send a message to the decision-maker before the latter party makes his choice, it is
known that this assumption may be restrictive (see Krishna and Morgan, 2004). Accordingly, whenMEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 3
neutral third party is called to propose an agreement after hearing the arguments of
each party. The neutral third party has no authority to impose a settlement, and
merely suggests an agreement that must be mutually acceptable. In contrast, under
arbitration, the neutral third party renders a ¯nal decision. While the agreement to
arbitrate is voluntary and the arguments presented are unveri¯able, the arbitrator's
decision is binding, in the sense that courts or military action will enforce it against a
possibly reluctant decision maker.
When studying mediation, the revelation principle (Myerson, 1982) implies that it
is su±cient to consider a particular kind of mechanism with one round of mediated
communication. The informed party makes a report to the mediator, who then makes
a recommendation to the informed party. Further, the mediator's strategy is such
that the informed party truthfully reveals his private information, and the decision-
maker follow the recommendation. We prove that the optimality of an incentive
compatible mechanism is equivalent to the optimality (from the informed party's point
of view) of the action assigned to the lowest possible state. This result, akin to the
revenue equivalence theorem in auction theory (see Myerson, 1981), allows to describe
optimal mediated communication protocols, and to compare the optimality properties
of mediation with negotiation and arbitration.
We prove that in any optimal mediated communication protocol, the mediator must
choose his recommendation randomly for some reports. Further, we demonstrate that
the communication protocol developed by Blume and Board (2006) actually achieves
the optimum of mediated communication.
5 In this mediation protocol, the informed
party reveals the state of the world precisely to the mediator. Subsequently, the me-
diator ¯lters this information into a coarser description of the state of the world, and
optimally adds noise. With some probability, he reports the ¯ltered information, oth-
erwise he sends a completely uninformative message. The decision maker then acts
considering negotiation, we allow both parties to engage in an arbitrarily large number of rounds of
communication.
5Ganguly and Ray (2005) also provide an example of mediation rule that improves upon Crawford
and Sobel's equilibrium, and Myerson (2007) even provides a numerical tool to compute such rules.
See also Kawamura (2006). None of these papers establish optimality of their examples.4 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
on the basis of reports. The two actions that follow the informative or uninformative
message are chosen so as to be identical for the lowest range of report, i.e., the medi-
ator actually sends a deterministic recommendation for su±ciently low reports. This
recommendation maximizes the informed party's payo® for the lowest possible state of
the world, and thus makes the mechanism optimal.
The intuition for why a successful mediator must randomize over recommendations
is simple. A mediator that would be a mere relay or censor of information would be
of no value here, as such transmission or censoring of information could be directly
performed by the informed party.
6 In particular, a perfectly credible mediator could
not improve upon the (most informative) equilibrium outcome by Crawford and Sobel.
In our environment, the mediator can only create value by controlling the °ow of
information between the parties. This role of mediation has already been pointed out
in other contexts by Brown and Ayres (1994), Ayres and Nalebu® (1997) and Mitusch
and Strausz (2005). In practice, this corresponds to the mediator's role in \collecting
and judiciously communicating select con¯dential material" (Rai®a, 1982, 108-09), and
\communicating selected information back and forth" (Singer, 1990). Obviously, the
role for mediation that we identify cannot be performed by holding joint, face-to-face
sessions with both parties, but requires private and separate caucuses, a practice that
is often, but not always, followed by mediators. Indeed, such caucuses are thought
to encourage parties to share con¯dential information with the mediator. Although
mediators frequently commit not to share what is learned with the other party, they
commonly use these caucuses to explore settlements possibilities. Interestingly, the
practical literature on mediation emphasizes the particular usefulness of this kind of
mediation in situations in which the intensity of con°ict is high (see for example, the
survey by Wall and Lynn, 1993). In international a®airs, shuttle diplomacy is a related
practice that has become popular since Henry Kissinger's e®orts in the Middle East
6Censoring by the mediator may be valuable in situations in which both parties have private informa-
tion, as the censoring may require knowledge of both reports, and could not be performed by either
party on its own. Indeed, in the practice of \con¯dential listening", each side reveals his settlement
position to the mediator in a private caucus, and the mediator then reveals whether there is any
overlap or common ground upon which to reach a settlement, without any further detail.MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 5
in the early 1970s and the Camp David negotiations mediated by Jimmy Carter, in
which a third party conveys information back and forth between parties, providing
suggestions for moving the con°ict toward resolution (see, for example, Kydd, 2006).
For sake of comparison, we assume that these procedures are designed to maximize
the ex ante welfare of the uninformed party, the decision-maker. (In some cases, this
turns out to also maximize the ex ante welfare of the informed party. ) In particular,
we exactly characterize the performance of both optimal arbitration and mediation.
Clearly, mediation dominates negotiation: any outcome that can be achieved without
a mediator can also be achieved with a mediator that plainly reports the informed
party's messages to the decision-maker. In turn, arbitration dominates mediation, as
any outcome that can be achieved by a mediator can also be achieved by an arbitrator
that always makes a recommendations in agreement with the ¯nal decision of the
decision maker.
Most importantly, we show that, relative to negotiation, mediation performs better
when the intensity of con°ict is high, but yields the same ex-ante welfare when the
intensity of con°ict is low.
7 Furthermore, we ¯nd that for small enough intensities,
there is no need for more than two rounds of communication to achieve the mediated
communication optimum. In this case the optimum is precisely achieved by the op-
timal `monotonic' equilibrium proposed by Krishna and Morgan (2004). When the
intensity of con°ict is intermediate, instead, the bene¯cial role of the mediator cannot
be replicated by however many rounds on unmediated communication.
Arbitration has been already studied in the literature on delegation (HolmstrÄ om,
1977; Melumad and Shibano, 1991; Alonso and Matouschek, 2004 and 2006). How-
ever, all these earlier contributions have restricted attention to deterministic mecha-
nisms. Since we show that the optimal mediation scheme is stochastic, a comparison
of the optimal properties of both procedures calls for allowing stochastic arbitration
7When the intensity of con°ict is too high, all the three mechanisms fail to induce any information
transmission and induce the same outcome.6 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
mechanisms as well. We prove here that the optimal protocol is indeed determinis-
tic, and is therefore the one identi¯ed in the earlier papers.
8 We conclude by noting
that arbitration always performs better than negotiation and mediation. This result
supports widespread views that a third party intermediary able to force an agreement
on the parties may be more e®ective than one acting as a mere consultant (see, for
example, the surveys by Wall and Lynn, 1993 and by Wall, Stark and Standifer, 2001).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-up and formally
de¯nes optimal arbitration, mediation and negotiation. Section 3 studies arbitra-
tion. Section 4 analyzes mediation, and Section 5 examines negotiation. Concluding
comments are in Section 6. All formal proofs are in the appendix.
2. Model
There are two players, the informed party and the decision-maker. The payo®s of
both players depend on the state of nature µ 2 £ = [0;1] and the action y 2 Y = <:
The informed party knows µ; the decision-maker does not know µ; and his prior is
uniform on £: While the informed party is better informed about the state of nature,
he lacks the decision-making ability: that is, y is chosen by the decision-maker.
We assume that the utility function of the decision-maker equals v (y;µ) = ¡(y ¡ µ)
2 ;
and that of the informed party equals u(y;µ) = ¡(y ¡ (µ + b))
2 where b > 0. For any
given µ; the informed party's preferred action is y = µ + b; while the decision-maker's
preferred action is y = µ: The utility of each party in state µ decreases in the distance
from the preferred action given µ to the action that is actually taken.
In this setting, we will study three di®erent classes of communication procedures:
arbitration, mediation and negotiation. Under arbitration the parties communicate
privately or publicly with a neutral trustworthy arbitrator, who then enforces a binding
decision. Mediation is similar to arbitration, but the recommendation of the mediator
is not binding: the decision-maker is free to disobey. Finally, under unmediated
8In coincident work, and following a di®erent approach, Kov¶ a· c and Mylovanov (2007) generalize this
last result to more general environments.MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 7
negotiation, the parties cannot employ a mediator or arbitrator, and communicate
only by sending direct messages to each other.
Let us formally introduce the optimization problems that are solved in each of the
three cases, looking at arbitration ¯rst. The revelation principle (Myerson, 1982)
allows us to restrict attention to arbitration protocols whereby the informed party re-
ports of the state of the world to the arbitrator, who makes the ¯nal decision. Further,
in equilibrium the informed party ¯nds it optimal to announce the true state. Let an
arbitration rule be a probability distribution p on Y £ £; with the interpretation that
p(y;µ) is the joint probability that the informed party reports state µ to the arbitrator
and the arbitrator recommends action y to the decision-maker.
De¯nition 1. An optimal arbitration rule p is a probability measure on Y £ £
that solves the following problem:
max
p(¢)
V = ¡
Z
Y ££
(y ¡ µ)
2 p(dy;dµ)
subject to
µ = argmax
^ µ2£
2
4¡
Z
Y
(y ¡ (µ + b))
2 p
³
dy;^ µ
´
3
5; 8µ 2 £; (IC ¡ IP)
1 =
Z
Y
p(dy;µ); 8µ 2 £: (PROB)
The constraint (PROB) re°ects the fact that µ is uniformly distributed on £. The
constraint (IC ¡ IP) re°ects the fact that the informed party should ¯nd it optimal
to tell the truth. An arbitration rule that satis¯es (IC ¡ IP) is called incentive
compatible.
By the revelation principle, one can restrict attention to mediation protocols whereby
the informed party reports the state of the world to the mediator, and the mediator
makes a recommendation to the decision-maker. Further, we can assume without loss8 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
of generality that the report is truthful, and the recommended action is incentive com-
patible (see Myerson, 1982). Formally, a mediation rule is a probability distribution p
on Y ££; with the interpretation that p(y;µ) is the joint probability that the informed
party reports state µ to the mediator and the mediator recommends action y to the
decision-maker.
De¯nition 2. An optimal mediation rule p is a probability measure on Y ££ that
solves the following problem:
max
p(¢)
V = ¡
Z
Y ££
(y ¡ µ)
2 p(dy;dµ)
subject to
µ = argmax
^ µ2£
2
4¡
Z
Y
(y ¡ (µ + b))
2 p
³
dy;^ µ
´
3
5; 8µ 2 £; (IC ¡ IP)
1 =
Z
Y
p(dy;µ); 8µ 2 £; (PROB)
y =
R
£ µp(y;dµ)
R
£ p(y;dµ)
; 8y 2 Y s.t.
Z
£
p(y;dµ) > 0: (IC ¡ DM)
The constraint (IC ¡ DM) states that the decision-maker never has an incentive to
deviate from an action that is prescribed to him by the mediator (the right-hand side
of the equality is the expectation of µ given the recommendation y, which is the action
that maximizes the decision-maker's payo® when the mediator recommends y). A
mediation rule that satis¯es (IC ¡IP) and (IC ¡DM) is called incentive compatible.
Finally, negotiation means that the informed party and the decision-maker engage
in several rounds of unmediated communication, sending a message to the other party
at each round. Similarly to Aumann and Hart (2003), a negotiation protocol will
include two sets, I and D; and T 2 N [f1g; where I and D are the sets of admissible
messages of the informed party and the decision-maker, respectively, and T is the
length of the protocol. The protocol will de¯ne a game with incomplete informationMEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 9
with T + 2 stages that proceeds as follows. At stage 0, Nature selects the state µ and
informs the informed party. At each of the stages 1;:::;T; the informed party and the
decision-maker simultaneously choose a message, and their choices become commonly
known at the end of the stage. At stage T + 1; the decision-maker selects an action.
The payo®s for the decision-maker and the informed party are v (y;µ) and u(y;µ)
respectively, where y is the action, and µ is the true state of nature. A negotiation
protocol will be called ¯nite if T < 1:9
De¯nition 3. An optimal negotiation protocol (I;D;T) solves the following prob-
lem:
max
p(¢);I;D;T
V = ¡
Z
Y ££
(y ¡ µ)
2 p(dy;dµ)
subject to
p is the outcome distribution of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by the protocol (I;D;T)
It is immediate from the statement of these optimization problems that any outcome
that can be achieved with mediation can be replicated with arbitration. It follows that
the decision-maker always at least weakly gains from arbitration relative to mediation.
Also, the revelation principle implies that any equilibrium of any negotiation protocol
is outcome equivalent to a truthful equilibrium of some incentive compatible mediation
rule. It follows that the decision-maker always at least weakly gains from mediation
relative to negotiation.
The following fact is also worth noting. Consider any feasible mediation rule, and
let V = ¡
R
Y ££ (y ¡ µ)
2 p(dy;dµ) be the ex-ante expected utility of the decision-maker;
and U (µ) = ¡
R
Y (y ¡ (µ + b))
2 p(dy;µ) be the expected utility of the informed party
given µ when the mediation rule p is in place. Crawford and Sobel (1982) prove that
V = EµU (µ) + b
2
9See Forges (1986) for an early application to economics of long negotiation, and Gerardi (2004) for
recent work on unmediated communication.10 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
As a consequence, an incentive compatible mediation rule p ex ante Pareto dominates
an incentive compatible rule q if and only if the decision-maker's ex-ante expected
utility under p is higher than under q: This fact will allow us to maximize the expected
utility of the decision-maker, with the understanding that the resulting mediation rule
will be Pareto optimal. Since any equilibrium of any negotiation protocol is outcome
equivalent to a truthful equilibrium of some incentive-compatible mediation rule, the
same statement holds also for the optimal negotiation protocol.
3. Arbitration
To solve for the optimal arbitration rule, we ¯rst develop a tractable way to deal
with the incentive compatibility constraint for the informed party. Let y
³
b µ
´
=
R
Y yp
³
dy;b µ
´
and ¾2
³
b µ
´
=
R
Y
³
y ¡ y
³
b µ
´´2
p
³
dy;b µ
´
be the conditional expectation
and the variance of y given a message b µ. Then an expected payo® of the informed
party of type µ who reported a message b µ in the mechanism p is
Z
Y
¡(y ¡ (µ + b))
2 p
³
dy;b µ
´
= ¡¾
2
³
b µ
´
¡
³
y
³
b µ
´
¡ (µ + b)
´2
Namely, the fact that the informed party has a quadratic loss function implies that
the informed party cares only about the expectation and the variance of the action.
One apparent bene¯t of this representation is that the constraint (IC ¡ IP) can be
stated in terms of (y (µ);¾2 (µ)) only. In addition, notice that the variance of y enters
the utility function of the informed party in a quasi-linear way, and thus it does not
interact with the type µ. Taking advantage of this fact, we can show (Lemma 2 in
Appendix A1) that the incentive compatibility for the informed party is equivalent to
two conditions: the expected action is non-decreasing in the state, and the informed
party's equilibrium payo® in any state µ can be expressed as a function of his payo®
in state 0 and of the expected action in the states below µ: This result is analogous to
a well-known result in mechanism design for environments where the preferences are
quasi-linear in money.
This representation allows us to prove the following theorem.MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 11
Theorem 1. The optimal arbitration rule selects the preferred action of the informed
party in the set
£
0;max
©
1 ¡ b; 1
2
ª¤
: Formally, it satis¯es:
y (µ) =
8
<
:
µ + b;
max
©
1 ¡ b; 1
2
ª
;
if
if
µ 2 [0;maxf1 ¡ 2b;0g)
µ 2 [maxf1 ¡ 2b;0g;1]
;
¾
2 (µ) = 0; 8µ 2 [0;1];
U (0) =
8
<
:
0;
¡
¡
1
2 ¡ b
¢2 ;
if
if
b · 1
2;
b > 1
2:
Observe that when the preference divergence parameter b is above 1
2, the optimal
arbitration rule is a °at one (the same decision is enforced no matter what the informed
party reports). For future reference notice that for these values of the parameter
communication is useless in the arbitration model, and, consequently, it is useless in
the mediation and negotiation models.
When b · 1
2; the optimal arbitration rule is deterministic. It implements the most
preferred action of the informed party for low states of the world, and is constant at
1 ¡ b for high states of the world. See Figure 1 for an illustration.12 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
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y y = µ + b
Figure 1 : Optimal arbitration
Melumad and Shibano (1991) already established the optimality of such a rule
among deterministic mechanisms. Optimization over deterministic mechanisms amounts
to a choice of a set of actions for an informed party to choose from. The optimal mech-
anism can be viewed as a delegation of the decision to the informed party with a limited
form of discretion: the informed party can enforce any decision he likes, as long as it
does not exceed 1¡b. Since the informed party's most preferred action in any state of
the world is higher than that of the decision maker, it pays to impose an upper bound
on the allowable actions. On the other hand, it turns out that the best way to make
use of the informed party's information in case of the low states is to grant a complete
freedom of choice of the action to the informed party.10
10For additional intuition and results on optimal delegation see also HolmstrÄ om (1977), Alonso and
Matouschek (2004, 2006).MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 13
Our result demonstrates that this delegation rule remains optimal even if we allow for
stochastic mechanisms. The tradeo® here is between an implementation of expected
action functions which are more desirable for the decision maker and incentive costs
due to an increased variance of the mechanism. It turns out that this tradeo® is
always resolved in favor of using mechanisms with the smallest possible variance, i.e.
deterministic mechanisms. The intuition for this is in Appendix A3.
4. Mediation
In this section, we look for the optimal mediation rule. We ¯rst note that the optimal
arbitration rule (always recommending the action y = 1
2) is feasible when b > 1
2. Since
the mediation problem is more constrained than the arbitration problem, this rule also
has to be the optimal mediation rule. So we focus on ¯nding a solution for b 2
¡
0; 1
2
¤
.
We will proceed as follows. First, we will derive an upper bound on the objec-
tive function. Next, we show that some of the mechanisms already proposed in the
literature achieve this upper bound for certain values of b.
Lemma 1.
(a) If a mediation rule p is incentive compatible, then V · ¡1
3b(1 ¡ b);
(b) An incentive compatible mediation rule is optimal if and only if U (0) = 0:
Lemma 1 can be compared to the revenue equivalence theorem in standard mech-
anism design. However, while in the revenue equivalence theorem, the revenue is
pinned down by the utility of the lowest type and the allocation, here the welfare from
an incentive compatible mechanism is determined only by the utility of the lowest type.
The reason for this di®erence is that in our problem, the mechanism designer is facing
two sets of incentive compatibility constraints, one for the informed party and one for
the decision-maker. The incentive compatibility constraints for the decision-maker al-
low us to express y (µ); which plays the role of an "allocation", as a function of U (0),
the lowest type's utility.14 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
Lemma 1 immediately implies that some of the procedures that have been proposed
in the literature as improvements upon one-shot negotiation are, in fact, optimal. One
of them is described below.
Theorem 2. For every b < 1
2; an optimal mediation rule is such that the mediator
randomizes between two actions in each state. With some probability ¹; he recommends
action b; and with probability 1 ¡ ¹ he recommends action ai when µ 2 [µi;µi+1);
i = 0;:::;N; where
µ0 = 0;
µi = 2bi
2 ¡
¡
2bN
2 ¡ 1
¢ 2i ¡ 1
2N ¡ 1
; i = 1;:::;N;
ai = b(i + 1) ¡ 2bi(N ¡ i) +
(2 ¡ b)i
2N ¡ 1
; i = 0;:::;N ¡ 1;
¹ = 1 ¡
1 ¡ 2b
4(1 ¡ b)
µ
1
N ¡ 1
¡
1
N
¡
2 ¡ b
bN ¡ 1
+
2 ¡ b
bN ¡ b + 1
¶
and N is such that
1
2N2 · b <
1
2(N ¡ 1)
2
It is straightforward to verify that this mediation rule is feasible and achieves V =
¡1
3b(1 ¡ b): See Figure 2 for an illustration.MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 15
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Figure 2 : Optimal mediation
(¹) (¹)
(1 ¡ ¹)
(1 ¡ ¹)
It is immediate to verify that, as the bias tends to zero, so does the probability ¹.
However, ¹ is not monotonic in the bias. Rather, for each value of N, it is concave and
equal to zero for the two extreme values of bias that are consistent with N. For these
extreme (and nongeneric) values, the mediation rule replicates the most informative
equilibrium of Crawford and Sobel.
The above rule appears in Blume and Board (2006), who propose it as an improve-
ment upon the most informative Crawford and Sobel equilibrium, but do not prove
that it is optimal, or interpret it as a mediation procedure. They propose the following
simple interpretation. Imagine that the informed party sends one message from the
interval [0;1] to the decision-maker, but the decision-maker gets his message only with
probability 1 ¡ ¹: with probability ¹, the message that the decision-maker gets is a16 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
random draw from the uniform distribution on [0;1]. It is straightforward to show
that this procedure is equivalent to the mediation rule formally described above.
Theorem 2 highlights the fact that the primary role of the mediator is to ¯lter the
information provided by the informed party. In fact, the optimal mediator's only
function is to introduce noise into communication. As Blume and Board (2006) note,
introducing noise can have opposing e®ects on the amount of information transmit-
ted. On the one hand, the direct e®ect of noise is to make the message received by
the decision-maker less informative. On the other hand, the presence of noise relaxes
the incentive compatibility for the informed party by weakening the link between his
message and the decision-maker's reaction, which makes it easier to motivate the in-
formed party to transmit more information. Theorem 2 shows that the second e®ect
dominates the ¯rst one; moreover, simply introducing an optimal amount of noise into
communication is optimal in the class of all mediation rules.
The optimal mediation rule described above is not unique. In particular, Lemma
1 implies that another mediation rule that has been proposed in the literature is also
optimal when b · 1
8. This is the mediation rule of Krishna and Morgan (2004), which
can be implemented with two rounds of cheap talk and is discussed in more detail in
the next section.
Observe also that in the optimal mediation problem the constraints are convex in p,
and the objective function is linear. Therefore, the set of optimal mediation rules is
convex, so that there is in general a continuum of optimal mediation rules.
5. Negotiation
The central result of this section is the following one.
Theorem 3. Finite negotiation achieves the optimal mediated outcome if and only if
b · 1=8.
The \if" part of the theorem is easy to show on the basis of our Lemma 1. Krishna
and Morgan (2004)'s optimal `monotonic' equilibrium in a two-period negotiation pro-
tocol exists if and only if b · 1=8, and achieves value U (0) = 0: the type-0 informedMEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 17
party achieves the optimal utility. In light of Lemma 1, for a mediation scheme to be
optimal, it is necessary and su±cient that U (0) = 0: Hence the optimal monotonic
two-period negotiation equilibrium by Krishna and Morgan performs as well as the
optimal mediation scheme.
For purposes of illustration, we sketch the construction of the optimal `monotonic'
equilibrium developed by Krishna and Morgan (2004). The reader is referred to that
paper for the details in the construction. In the ¯rst period of the negotiation protocol,
the informed party signals whether the state is above or below some threshold µ
¤.
Simultaneously, the informed party and the decision-maker exchange messages in a
meeting, so as to emulate a public randomization device with probabilities p and 1¡p.11
In the second round of communication, if the informed party's message indicates that
the state is below µ
¤, a partitional equilibrium is played, as in Crawford and Sobel
(1982). Given the number of elements in the partition N such that 1=
£
2(N + 1)
2¤
·
b < 1=[2(N)
2]; and the set of thresholds fµi : i = 0;:::;N ¡ 1g, with µi = 2bi2; µN¡1 =
µ
¤; the informed party reports in which interval [µi;µi+1] the state lies, and the decision-
maker takes the corresponding action ai = [µi + µi+1]=2: These thresholds assure that
µ0 = 0; µ1 = 2b and hence a0 = b so that, optimally, U (0) = 0:
If the informed party's message reported that the state is above µ
¤ = µN¡1 in the
¯rst round of communication, the continuation play depends on the outcome of the si-
multaneous exchange of messages. With some probability p, no further communication
occurs and the decision-maker takes his action accordingly: a¤
N¡1 = [1+µN¡1]=2: With
probability 1¡p, the informed party further signals whether the state is in some lower
interval [µN¡1;µN], or upper interval [µN;1], upon which the decision-maker takes his
action: aN¡1 = [µN¡1 + µN]=2 and aN = [1 + µN]=2 respectively.
Krishna and Morgan prove that such equilibria exist for b · 1=8 with the values
µN and p that satisfy the following two indi®erence conditions. The type-µN sender
11Such meetings in which parties simultaneously exchange messages is called a jointly controlled
lottery. The reader is referred to Aumann and Hart (2003) and Krishna and Morgan (2004) for a
formal de¯nition.18 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
is indi®erent between the outcome aN¡1 and aN; and the type-µN¡1 sender is indif-
ferent between the outcome aN¡2 and the lottery determining the outcome aN¡1 with
probability (1 ¡ p) and the outcome a¤
N¡1 with probability p:
The \only if" part is considerably more involved, and its proof is relegated to the ap-
pendix. To gain some intuition for this part, recall from Lemma 1 that for a mediation
scheme to be optimal, it is necessary and su±cient that the lowest informed party's
type be mapped into the action b (with probability 1). Since preferences are quadratic,
any lottery y over actions can be summarized by its ¯rst two moments. We may thus
represent the preferences of the di®erent informed party's types by their indi®erence
curves in the plane de¯ned by the lotteries' expectation and variance. Figure 3 shows
the indi®erence curves going through the lottery that is degenerate on the action b for
two di®erent types µ
0 > µ. Observe that if the informed party's type µ is indi®erent be-
tween the (degenerate) lottery b and some nondegenerate lottery, then type µ
0 strictly
prefers this nondegenerate lottery to b. To put it di®erently, if in some equilibrium the
informed party's type µ is mapped into the action b, then so must be all lower types.
Furthermore, in equilibrium, there can be at most one type indi®erent between the
action b and some nondegenerate lottery.MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 19
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Figure 3: Indi®erence curves for µ;µ
0 (µ
0 > µ)
Suppose that, in some equilibrium, the action b is chosen when the state is 0, so
that the optimal mediated outcome is achieved. Then it must be that, for some µ
¤,
the action b is ¯nally chosen for almost all states in [0;µ
¤]: Furthermore, the action b
cannot be ¯nally adopted with positive probability when the state is larger than µ
¤: For
this to conform with the decision-maker's equilibrium beliefs, it must be that µ
¤ = 2b:
Consider now the choice of the type-µ
¤ informed party. By following any of the
strategies that achieves action b, the informed party bears a cost (b ¡ µ
¤ ¡ b)
2 = (µ
¤)
2.
But this type of informed party may be better o® by upsetting the equilibrium, devi-
ating and mimicking the higher types. At every information set, the informed party
can always choose the message that leads to the lottery over actions with the lowest
expected value, among all messages that do not necessarily lead to the action b. All the
actions that may be realized by this lottery are above b; which is the action supposed to
be associated in equilibrium with informed party types smaller than µ
¤: Further, such
a strategy must eventually lead to actions no larger than (µ
¤ + 1)=2 { the expected20 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
value over types in (µ
¤;1). Therefore, we must have
(µ
¤)
2 ·
µ
µ
¤ + 1
2
¡ µ
¤ ¡ b
¶2
;
or b · 1=8,
because µ
¤ = 2b.
More succinctly, the `only if' part of the above theorem follows because quadratic
preferences imply that such an equilibrium be monotonic, in the sense that the set
of states for which the action b should ¯nally be chosen constitute an initial interval
(i.e., an interval containing 0). If the bias is large, this imposes a signi¯cant cost on
the informed party when the state is close enough to the upper end of this interval,
the informed party may be better o® pretending that the state of the world is larger.
This intuition suggests that the result should extend to the case of communication of
unbounded length, although we do not prove this here.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
We have compared the performance of three common dispute resolution processes
{ arbitration, mediation and negotiation { in the framework of Crawford and Sobel
(1982). Under arbitration, the two parties commit to conform to the decision of a neu-
tral third party. Under mediation instead, compliance with the third party's suggested
settlement is voluntary. Finally, under unfacilitated negotiation, the two parties en-
gage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. We have characterized and
compared the optimal arbitration and mediation schemes, and identi¯ed necessary and
su±cient conditions for negotiation to perform as well as mediation. The optimal me-
diation scheme corresponds to the communication protocol developed by Blume and
Board (2006). Thus, we ¯nd that mediators may act optimally in dispute resolution
by ¯ltering the unmediated communication and introducing noise to it. We have found
that mediation performs better than negotiation when the con°ict of interest is inter-
mediate, whereas a mediator is unnecessary and two rounds of communication su±ce
when the con°ict of interest is low.MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 21
While our most direct applications are in the contexts of international crises, legal
confrontations, and business transactions, as mentioned earlier, the mediation rules we
characterize do not only refer to the practice of professional mediators. Other economic
institutions can play the role of mediators. For instance, it has been argued that the use
of consultants during ¯rm restructuring (Mitusch and Strausz, 1999), or of legislative
committees (Li, 2007) ful¯ll this function. In other settings, however, it is hard to
see what institutions would accomplish this purpose. For instance, the communication
between investors and ¯nancial analysts appears to be unmediated. This raises the
question of why this is the case. Our paper o®ers one possible explanation. Namely,
it may be the case that the \Chinese walls" that separate by law the brokerage and
investment divisions of banks are su±ciently e®ective in mitigating the analysts' biases
to render mediation useless (as is the case, formally, when b < 1=8). Another important
di®erence is that monetary transfers (i.e. payments) are standard practice in this
setting, which we do not allow here.
Alternatively, this may suggest that other models of cheap talk, such, as for instance,
Dewatripont and Tirole's (2005), might be better suited than Crawford and Sobel's,
depending on the particular application. As a ¯rst step towards characterizing the
optimal properties of mediation, this paper illustrates the potential and the limitations
of mediation and negotiation in the set-up by Crawford and Sobel. Understanding
when and how mediation or negotiation are likely to be e®ective beyond the classical
framework by Crawford and Sobel is a further, formidable and fundamental challenge.22 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
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7. Appendix A: Arbitration
7.1. A1. Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. fy (µ);¾2 (µ)gµ2£ satisfy (IC ¡ IP) if and only if
(i) y (µ) is non-decreasing;
(ii) ¡¾2 (µ) = U (µ)+(y (µ) ¡ (µ + b))
2, and U (µ) = U (0)+
Z µ
0
2
³
y
³
e µ
´
¡
³
e µ + b
´´
de µ.
Proof. <Only If>
(i) From incentive compatibility for every µ;µ
0 2 £ we have
¡¾
2 (µ) ¡ (y (µ) ¡ (µ + b))
2 ¸ ¡¾
2 (µ
0) ¡ (y (µ
0) ¡ (µ + b))
2 ;
¡¾
2 (µ
0) ¡ (y (µ
0) ¡ (µ
0 + b))
2 ¸ ¡¾
2 (µ) ¡ (y (µ) ¡ (µ
0 + b))
2 :
Adding up and rearranging we get
(µ ¡ µ
0)(y (µ) ¡ y (µ
0)) ¸ 0:
(ii) By the Envelope Theorem we have
U (µ) = U (0) +
µ Z
0
2
³
y
³
e µ
´
¡
³
e µ + b
´´
de µ:
Hence
¡¾
2 (µ) = U (µ) + (y (µ) ¡ (µ + b))
2 :
<If>
We need to show that for every µ;µ
0 2 £,
¡
¡¾
2 (µ) ¡ (y (µ) ¡ (µ + b))
2¢
¡
³
¡¾
2 (µ
0) ¡ (y (µ
0) ¡ (µ + b))
2´
¸ 0:2 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
Notice that
¡¾
2 (µ
0) ¡ (y (µ
0) ¡ (µ + b))
2 = ¡¾
2 (µ
0) ¡ (y (µ
0) ¡ (µ
0 + b))
2 ¡ 2y (µ
0)(µ
0 + b)
+(µ
0 + b)
2 + 2y (µ
0)(µ + b) ¡ (µ + b)
2 = U (µ
0) ¡
µ0 Z
µ
2
³
y (µ
0) ¡
³
e µ + b
´´
de µ:
So
U (µ) ¡ U (µ
0) +
µ0 Z
µ
2
³
y (µ
0) ¡
³
e µ + b
´´
de µ =
µ0 Z
µ
2
³
y (µ
0) ¡ y
³
e µ
´´
de µ ¸ 0:
7.2. A2. Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 2 the optimal arbitration rule has to
solve the following simpli¯ed problem:
max
y(¢);¾2(¢);U(0)
V =
1 Z
0
¡
¡¾
2 (µ) ¡ (y (µ) ¡ µ)
2¢
dµ:
subject to
y (µ) is non-decreasing; (MON)
¾
2 (µ) = ¡U (0) ¡
µ Z
0
2
³
y
³
e µ
´
¡
³
e µ + b
´´
de µ ¡ (y (µ) ¡ (µ + b))
2 ; (ENV )
¾
2 (µ) ¸ 0; U (0) · 0 (NONNEG)
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 3. If (y (µ);¾2 (µ);U (0)) are feasible, then
V
¡
y (µ);¾
2 (µ);U (0)
¢
= U (0) + 2
Z 1
0
y (µ)(1 ¡ µ ¡ b)dµ + b
2 ¡
1
3
:
Proof. Substitute constraint (ENV ) into the objective function and change the order
of integration in the double integral.
Lemma 4. Let b 2
£
0; 1
2
¤
. Mechanism (y (µ);¾2 (µ);U (0)) is optimal.MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 3
Proof. Assume there exists a mechanism
³
b y (µ);b ¾
2 (µ); b U (0)
´
which achieves a strictly
higher welfare than the mechanism (y (µ);¾2 (µ);U (0)).
By Lemma 3 we have
0 < V
³
b y (µ);b ¾
2 (µ); b U (0)
´
¡ V (y (µ);¾2 (µ);U (0)) =
= b U (0) ¡ U (0) + 2
1 Z
0
(b y (µ) ¡ y (µ))(1 ¡ µ ¡ b)dµ.
Also
0 < V
³
b y (µ);b ¾
2 (µ); b U (0)
´
¡ V (y (µ);¾2 (µ);U (0)) =
= ¡
1 Z
0
¡
(b y (µ) ¡ µ)
2 + b ¾
2 (µ)
¢
dµ +
1 Z
0
¡
(y (µ) ¡ µ)
2 + ¾2 (µ)
¢
dµ ·
· ¡
1 Z
0
(b y (µ) ¡ µ)
2 dµ +
1 Z
0
(y (µ) ¡ µ)
2 dµ =
= 2
1 Z
0
(b y (µ) ¡ y (µ))(µ ¡ y (µ))dµ ¡
1 Z
0
(b y (µ) ¡ y (µ))
2 dµ <
< 2
1 Z
0
(b y (µ) ¡ y (µ))(µ ¡ y (µ))dµ.
Adding up two inequalities,
0 < b U (0) ¡ U (0) + 2
1 Z
0
(b y (µ) ¡ y (µ))(1 ¡ b ¡ y (µ))dµ.
Substituting y (µ) and using (ENV ) we get
0 < b U (0) ¡ U (0) + 2
1¡2b Z
0
(b y (µ) ¡ y (µ))(1 ¡ 2b ¡ µ)dµ =
= b U (0) +
1¡2b Z
0
db U(µ)
dµ (1 ¡ 2b ¡ µ)dµ ¡ U (0) ¡
1¡2b Z
0
dU(µ)
dµ (1 ¡ 2b ¡ µ)dµ =
= b U (0) ¡ b U (0)(1 ¡ 2b) +
1¡2b Z
0
b U (µ)dµ ¡ U (0) + U (0)(1 ¡ 2b) ¡
1¡2b Z
0
U (µ)dµ =
= 2b
³
b U (0) ¡ U (0)
´
+ 2
0
@
1¡2b Z
0
³
b U (µ) ¡ U (µ)
´
dµ
1
A.
However, this is not possible since b U (µ) · U (µ) = 0 for every µ 2 [0;1 ¡ 2b].4 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
Lemma 5. Let b > 1
2. If
³
b y (µ);b ¾
2 (µ); b U (0)
´
are optimal, then b y (µ) is constant on
(0;1).
Proof. Suppose that b y (µ) is not constant on (0;1); i.e. 9µ;µ
0 2 (0;1) such that µ
0 > µ;
b y (µ
0) > b y (µ):
Consider the following policy:
y1 (µ) = b y (0) for every µ
¾
2
1 (µ) = b ¾
2 (0)
U1 (0) = b U (0):
Obviously (y1 (µ);¾2
1 (µ);U1 (0)) satisfy constraint (MON) and (NONNEG). More-
over, this policy achieves a strictly higher value of the objective function than the
original policy, since, by Lemma 3,
V
¡
b y;b ¾
2¢
= b U (0) + 2
1 Z
0
b y (µ)(1 ¡ µ ¡ b)dµ + b
2 ¡
1
3
< b U (0) + 2
1 Z
0
b y (µ)dµ
1 Z
0
(1 ¡ µ ¡ b)dµ + b
2 ¡
1
3
< b U (0) + 2b y (0)
1 Z
0
(1 ¡ µ ¡ b)dµ + b
2 ¡
1
3
= V
¡
y1;¾
2
1
¢
:
The ¯rst inequality is due to (MON) and the fact that b y (µ) is not constant on (0;1);
the last inequality is due to (MON) and the fact that
R 1
0 (1 ¡ µ ¡ b)dµ = 1
2 ¡ b < 0.
So the original policy is suboptimal.
Lemma 6. Let b > 1
2. Mechanism (y (µ);¾2 (µ);U (0)) is optimal.
Proof. By Lemma 5, if b y (µ) is a part of an optimal policy, then it is constant on
(0;1): Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to policies such that b y (µ)MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 5
is constant on [0;1]: Take any such policy
³
b y (µ);b ¾
2 (µ); b U (0)
´
: Then
V
¡
y (µ);¾
2 (µ);U (0)
¢
¡ V
³
b y (µ);b ¾
2 (µ); b U (0)
´
=
1 Z
0
¡
¡¾
2 (µ) ¡ (y (µ) ¡ µ)
2¢
dµ ¡
1 Z
0
¡
¡b ¾
2 (µ) ¡ (b y (µ) ¡ µ)
2¢
dµ
¸ ¡
1 Z
0
(y (µ) ¡ µ)
2 dµ +
1 Z
0
(b y (µ) ¡ µ)
2 dµ = b y
2 (0) ¡ b y (0) +
1
4
¸ 0;
where the ¯rst inequality follows from the fact that b ¾
2 (µ) ¸ ¾2 (µ) = 0:
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from Lemmas 4 and 6.
7.3. A3. Intuition for Theorem 1. To gain the intuition for why the optimal
arbitration rule is deterministic, consider, for example, reducing y (µ) by a small ± > 0
on an interval
£
0;µ
¤
µ [0;1 ¡ 2b]. The distance between the expected action and the
decision-maker's most preferred action is thus reduced from b to b¡± on this interval.
The expected gain for the decision-maker is
µ Z
0
¡
¡(b ¡ ±)
2¢
dµ ¡
µ Z
0
(¡b2)dµ = (2b ¡ ±)±µ.
In order to implement this new expected action function in an incentive compatible
way we need to adjust a conditional variance function. First, we need to adjust ¾2 (¢)
on the interval
£
0;µ
¤
. Di®erentiation of (ENV ) yields
d
dµ¾2 (µ) = ¡2(y (µ) ¡ (µ + b)) d
dµy (µ)
¯
¯
y(µ)=µ+b¡± = 2±.
Intuitively, since we are implementing expected actions which are below the most
preferred actions of the informed party, we need to discourage him from choosing higher
actions by increasing their variance. The variance for the types on the interval
£
0;µ
¤
is thus ¾2 (µ) = 2±µ.
Second, the variance for the types immediately above µ cannot be lower than the
variance ¾2 ¡
µ
¢
= 2±µ, since otherwise the type µ could slightly overstate his type and
receive his most preferred expected action, µ + b, at a smaller variance. The incentive6 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
compatibility of the original mechanism implies that the variance for all the types
above µ is at least as large as the variance of the type µ.
The expected loss for the decision-maker from the variance is thus at least
µ Z
0
2±µdµ +
1 Z
µ
2±µdµ =
¡
2 ¡ µ
¢
±µ.
Hence the net bene¯t for the decision-maker is at most
¡
(2b ¡ ±) ¡
¡
2 ¡ µ
¢¢
±µ < 0
where the inequality follows from ± > 0, µ < 1 and b · 1
2.
8. Appendix B: Mediation
8.1. B1. Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. By (IC ¡ DM) and (PROB);
(1)
Z
£
y (µ)dµ =
Z
Y ££
yp(dy;dµ) =
Z
Y ££
µp(dy;dµ) =
1
2
:
By (IC ¡ DM);
(2) cov (µ;y (µ)) = cov (µ;y) = cov (Eµ [µ j y];y) = cov (y;y) = var(y);
By Lemma 3 (see Appendix A.2) and equations (1) and (2);
V = U (0) + 2
1 Z
0
y (µ)(1 ¡ µ ¡ b)dµ + b
2 ¡
1
3
= U (0) ¡ 2
1 Z
0
y (µ)µdµ + 1 ¡ b + b
2 ¡
1
3
= U (0) ¡ 2var(y) +
1
6
¡ b + b
2: (3)
On the other hand,MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 7
V = ¡E (y ¡ µ)
2
= ¡E
"µµ
µ ¡
1
2
¶
¡
µ
y ¡
1
2
¶¶2#
= ¡var(µ) + 2cov (y;µ) ¡ var(y)
= var(y) ¡ var(µ) = var(y) ¡
1
12
; (4)
where the second equality follows from (1), the third equality follows from (2), and
the last equality holds because µ is uniformly distributed.
Combining (3) and (4); we get
U (0) = 3var(y) ¡
1
4
+ b ¡ b
2:
Since U (0) · 0; we have
(5) var(y) ·
1
12
¡
1
3
b +
1
3
b
2:
Substituting (5) into (4); we get
V · ¡
1
3
¡
b ¡ b
2¢
:
This holds with equality if and only if U(0) = 0.
9. Appendix C: Negotiation
9.1. C1. Proof of Theorem 3. First, let us prove an auxiliary result about a helpful
property of quadratic preferences.
Lemma 7. Let µ1;µ2 2 [0;1], µ1 < µ2. Let l be a lottery on Y such that l does not
put probability one on action b, and µ1 weakly prefers l to action b. Then µ2 strictly
prefers l to action b.
Proof. Recall that the utility of a lottery l with mean y and variance ¾2 for the informed
party of type µ equals U (µ) = ¡¾2¡(y¡(µ + b))2. Consequently, type µ weakly prefers8 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
l to action b if and only if
¾
2 + (y ¡ b)
2 · 2µ(y ¡ b);
which implies that y ¸ b, no matter what µ is. So if µ2 > µ1 and the inequality above
holds weakly for µ1, then it has to hold strictly for µ2.
We restrict attention to canonical equilibria in the sense of Aumann and Hart (2003):
that is equilibria in which revelations by the informed party alternate with jointly
controlled lotteries. For expositional simplicity, let us suppose that the players, instead
of conducting jointly controlled lotteries, have access to a randomization device that
sends messages at the jointly controlled lottery stages, so that at each stage, either the
informed party or the device sends one public message.
First, let us introduce some notation. Let p be an optimal mediation rule, and sup-
pose that p is implementable with ¯nite cheap talk. Let £1 := fµ 2 £ : p(bjµ) = 1g:
We know that £1 6= ;; because 0 2 £1: Let N be the set of all possible sequences
of messages that can be observed in the equilibrium that implements p; and let ¹(¢jµ)
be the probability distribution over N conditional on the state being µ: Let P (¢jn) be
the decision-maker's posterior upon observing n 2 N; that is, for £ µ [0;1]; n 2 N;
P (£jn) =
R
£ ¹(njµ)dF (µ)
R
[0;1] ¹(njµ)dF (µ)
; if
Z
[0;1]
¹(njµ)dF (µ) > 0
Let us also assume that
P (£jn) = 1 if
Z
[0;1]
¹(njµ)dF (µ) = 0 and [¹(njµ) > 0 ) µ 2 £]
The last assumption implies that if a particular path of play can only appear in one
state µ
¤, then upon observing this path of play, the DM concludes that the state is
µ
¤ with probability one (this restriction on conditional probabilities seems somewhat
arbitrary, but it is commonly made in signaling models with a continuum of types when
talking about separating equilibria).
Finally, let n(t) be the restriction of sequence n 2 N to the ¯rst t stages (including
stage t), and let nt be the message sent at stage t according to sequence n: We canMEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 9
also de¯ne ¹(n(t)jµ) :=
R
n02N:n0(t)=n(t) d¹(njµ), the probability that n(t) realizes in
equilibrium given µ.
Lemma 8. £1 = [0;2b].
Proof. For any period t = 0;:::;T and partial history n(t), let
A(n(t)) = fµ 2 [0;1] : 9n
0 2 support ¹(¢jµ);n
0(t) = n(t)g
be the set of types whose equilibrium behavior is consistent with partial history n(t).
Let £1(n(t)) = fµ 2 A(n(t)) : for a.e. (with respect to ¹(¢jµ)) n0 2 N s.t. n0(t) =
n(t);E(µjn0) = bg be the set of types that, following the history n(t), get action b
with probability one. Let us prove that for every t = 0;:::;T and n(t) such that
£1(n(t)) 6= ;,
(a) £1(n(t)) = [0;µ(n(t))] \ A(n(t)), for some µ(n(t)) ¸ b;
(b) E(µjn(t);£1(n(t))) = b.
The proof will be by induction, starting from t = T. Take any partial history
n(T ¡ 1) such that £1(n(T ¡ 1)) 6= ;. Suppose, without loss of generality, that T
is a revelation stage. By Lemma 1 of Crawford and Sobel (1982), the equilibrium
of the subgame following the history n(T ¡ 1) is partitional. In particular, since
£1(n(T ¡ 1)) 6= ;, there exists an interval [a(n);µ(n)i (closed or open on the right)
such that, after the history n(T ¡ 1), all types in this interval, and only them, choose
messages that lead to action b; that is, £1(n) = [a(n);µ(n)i\A(n(t)). Moreover, a(n)
can be taken to be 0. Suppose not, that is, a(n) > µ, for some µ 2 A(n(t)). Then in
the partitional equilibrium of the subgame that we consider, type µ achieves an action
lower than b, which is strictly worse for it than action b. But it could have achieved
action b if it played like type a(n) { a contradiction. It also has to be the case that
E(µjn;£1(n)) = E(µjn) = b, and, consequently, that µ(n) ¸ b.
Now suppose that the statement is true for all partial histories of length t+1;:::;T,
and let us prove it for partial histories of length t. Consider any n(t) such that
£1(n(t)) 6= ;. By de¯nition, £1(n(t)) µ A(n(t)). There are two cases to consider:10 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
(a) t is a revelation stage. We have to prove that
µ
0;µ
00 2 £1(n(t)); µ 2 (µ
0;µ
00) \ A(n(t)) ) µ 2 £1(n(t))
and that
µ
0 2 £1(n(t)); µ 2 \A(n(t)); µ < µ
0 ) µ 2 £1(n(t))
Suppose µ
0;µ
00 2 £1(n(t)) and µ 2 A(n(t)). Then both µ
0 and µ
00 choose contin-
uation strategies at stage t that guarantee action b with probability one. Incentive
compatibility implies that µ also has to choose a continuation strategy that guarantees
b with probability one { otherwise either µ
0 or µ
00 has an incentive to imitate µ. This
means that µ 2 £1(n(t)).
Now, suppose that µ
0 2 £1(n(t)); µ 2 \A(n(t)) and µ < µ
0. This means that µ
0
chooses a continuation strategy at stage t that guarantees action b with probability
one. If µ chooses a strategy that results in a di®erent lottery over actions, then, by
Lemma 7, µ
0 should strictly prefer to imitate µ { a contradiction. This means that µ
also chooses a continuation strategy at stage t that guarantees action b with probability
one, so µ 2 £1(n(t)).
This proves that £1(n(t)) = [0;µ(n(t))] \ A(n(t)).
Since t is a revelation stage,
£1(n(t)) =
0
@
[
n02N:n0(t)=n(t)
£1(n
0(t + 1))
1
A n B;
where B µ [0;1] includes at most one type. To see this, note that it follows from the
de¯nition that £1(n(t)) µ
S
n02N:n0(t)=n(t) £1(n0(t+1)). Now suppose that £1(n(t)) ½
S
n02N:n0(t)=n(t) £1(n0(t + 1)), and take any µ 2
S
n02N:n0(t)=n(t) £1(n0(t + 1)) n £1(n(t)).
By the de¯nition of £(n(t)), it must be the case that type µ is randomizing at stage t
between messages that will result in action b with probability one, and messages that
results in some other lottery. But with quadratic preferences, there can be at most one
such type. To see this, suppose, by way of contradiction, that there are two types, µ1
and µ2, both in
S
n02N:n0(t)=n(t) £1(n0(t+1))n£1(n(t)), such that after history n(t), typeMEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION 11
µi is randomizing between messages that will result in action b with probability one,
and messages that results in some other lottery (call it li). Without loss of generality,
suppose that µ1 < µ2. Then it must be the case that µ1 is indi®erent between action
b and lottery l1, so, by Lemma 7, µ2 strictly prefers l1 to b and, consequently, to l2.
This means that imitating µ1 is a pro¯table deviation for µ2 { a contradiction. This
proves that B contains at most one type.
So
E(µjn(t);£1(n(t))) =
R
n02N:n0(t)=n(t) E[µjn0(t + 1);£1(n(t))]d¹(n0(t + 1)jn(t);£1(n(t)))
=
R
n02N:n0(t)=n(t) fE[µjn0(t + 1);£1(n0(t + 1))]P[£1(n0(t + 1))jn0(t + 1);£1(n(t))] + E[µjn0(t + 1);
£1(n(t)) n £1(n0(t + 1))]P[£1(n(t)) n £1(n0(t + 1))jn0(t + 1);£1(n(t))]d¹(n0(t + 1)jn(t);£1(n(t)))
= b;
where the last equality follows from the fact that
P(£1(n
0(t + 1))jn
0(t + 1);£1(n(t))) =
8
<
:
1; if n0(t + 1) 2 support ¹(¢j£1(n(t));
0; otherwise
and from the induction hypothesis. It follows immediately that µ(n(t)) ¸ b.
(b) t is a jointly controlled lottery stage. Then it follows from the de¯nition of
£1(n(t)) that
£1(n(t)) =
\
n02N:n0(t)=n(t)
£1(n
0(t + 1)) =
\
n02N:n0(t)=n(t)
[0;µ(n
0(t + 1))] \ A(n
0(t + 1))
If t is a jointly controlled lottery stage, then for any n0;n00 2 N such that n0(t) =
n00(t) = n(t), A(n0(t + 1)) = A(n00(t + 1)) = A(n(t)). So
£1(n(t)) = A(n(t)) \
\
n02N:n0(t)=n(t)
[0;µ(n
0(t + 1))] = A(n(t)) \ [0;µ(n(t))]
where µ(n(t)) = infn02N:n0(t)=n(t)µ(n0(t + 1)). Furthermore, the ¯rst equality above,
together with the fact that 8n0 2 N : n0(t) = n(t);E(µjA(n(t)) \ [0;µ(n0(t + 1))]) = b
implies that E(µjA(n(t)) \ [0;µ(n(t))]) = b.
So we have proved that for every t = 0;:::;T and n(t) such that £1(n(t)) 6= ;,
(a) £1(n(t)) = [0;µ(n(t))] \ A(n(t)), for some µ(n(t)) ¸ b;12 MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND NEGOTIATION
(b) E(µjn(t);£1(n(t))) = b.
In particular, if t = 0, then n(t) is an empty history, £1(t) = £1 by de¯nition, and
A(n(t)) = [0;1]. Consequently, £1 = [0;µ0] for some µ0 ¸ b, and E(µj£1) = b. It
follows immediately that µ0 = 2b.
Proof of Theorem 3 (Only If). Because any type µ smaller than and su±ciently close
to 2b strictly prefers (2b + 1)=2 over b, it follows that any such type µ also strictly
prefers to the outcome b any non-degenerate distribution q over actions with support
contained in [b;(2b + 1)=2].
Consider any strategy ¹ such that, after any history n(t ¡ 1) such that t is a reve-
lation stage and supportP (µjn(t ¡ 1))\[2b;1] 6= ;, the sender chooses a message m that
minimizes E [µjn(t ¡ 1);m0] among the messages m0 such that supportP (µjn(t ¡ 1);m0)\
[2b;1] 6= ;: Then at the ¯rst stage (without loss of generality, suppose that this is a
revelation stage), this strategy calls for sending a message m such that E [µjm] ·
[2b + 1]=2 = E (µj[2b;1]); and by the law of iterated expectations, for every stage t;
E [µjn(t ¡ 1);m] · E [µjn(t ¡ 1)]: It is clear that since £1 = [0;2b]; this strategy
cannot lead to any action that is lower than 2b: On the other hand, at the termi-
nal stage T; for any history n that can realize if strategy ¹ is followed, E (µjn) ·
E (µjn(t ¡ 1)) · ::: · E (µjn(1)) · (2b + 1)=2; so the action that will be executed
cannot exceed (2b + 1)=2: It follows that the strategy ¹ induces a lottery over actions
whose support is contained in [2b;(2b + 1)=2]; and a type µ = 2b ¡ " for " > 0 small
enough will prefer following this strategy to the strategy that induces action b with
certainty.
It follows that p is not incentive compatible.